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The Arnold s
of Southwest
Arkansas
102 YEARS OF LAW
In 1879, William Hendrick Arnold, a seventeen-year-old school
teacher in Clark County, began in
earnest to read Blackstone and
other relevant legal matter as a
first step to becoming a lawyer. His
formal education had included attendance at Ansley's Academy at
Artesian, a kind of preparatory
school that his father David Saxon
Arnold, a farmer, had helped establish; but the considerable
learning that he acquired thereafter was entirely by dint of individual effort. David Saxon Arnold
had received a classical education
at Erskine College in South
Carolina in the 1840s before moving to Arkansas, but much formal
education for his family was made
impossible by the civil war and its
aftermath.
In 1862, David enlisted in the
confederate cause in El Dorado,
and he returned home in 1864 after
being discharged as a captain in
the Louisiana Cavalry. His wife
Temperance Lucinda Arnold,
speaking of his military commissions, wrote: "I remember the old
papers with the seals, worn and
broken where they were folded.
They were such sad old relics, funereal in every respect. We never

talked of them, and looking back
now it seems to me we laid it all
down and tried to forget all its horrors. I do not know what became of
his sword."' During the war, the
family became refugees and settled for a time in Miller County
near Garland City until the war
ended. After the war, of course,
there was very little in the way of
education available. William
Hendrick Arnold wrote that "we
never had any schooling in those
days other than for a few months in
the year at uncertain intervals.
Teachers could not be had as the
people were all very poor on account' 2 of the ravages of the civil
war.

It would be some time after the
war ended before even normal
civil regulation, much less anything resembling schools, could be
very firmly established. David Arnold's cotton was sometimes stolen by the Union soldiers occupying South Arkansas. On one occasion, William reports, "a cavalcade of these officers came to our
house.. .and simply took possession. They had their own cook with
them, and the family, consisting of
my mother and us children, stayed
out of the house, and I never heard
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such frying and cooking as went on
in our kitchen. I came very near
starving as these men had spent
the previous night with us, and
after they had gotten through eating their dinner which I remember
was cooked with so much noise
and sputtering, there was one biscuit as large as a saucer left and I
made a grab for it, but my mother
seized me and told me not to touch
it. She thought it was a 3Yankee
biscuit, and threw it out."1
Why William turned to the law is
not altogether clear. Perhaps it
was because his paternal grandfather Ira Arnold had been a trial
judge in South Carolina as had
others of his eighteenth-century
ancestors. Just as likely, it was because farming was not much to his
liking. Recalling the days when
his work at Ansley Academy had
been interrupted by farm duties,
he wrote that he "plowed up new
ground in which there were roots of
elm trees running all around on top
of the ground. I made some marvelous escapes and sometimes the
plow would strike a stump or root
and the handles would be thrust
against me, other times the roots
would fly back and strike my knees
and shins. I pursued this work with

so much energy that one of my
knees swelled up for six weeks,
and while I was in bed I continued
my studies."' It was then, he said,
that he read "history, biographies
of great men, exploits of great
generals, especially Napoleon,
and had it in my mind that I possessed great military genius, and
resolved to be a general in war,
and a lawyer in time of
peace... These golden dreams
have recurred with less frequency
as the years have gone by, and I
have reached the conclusion that a
good, reliable citizen is worth
more to a country than some of
those who agitate and bring on
strife. '
William's ambition to become a
lawyer, however, was in fact
realized. In 1881 he took up the
study of law in the offices of Warren & Mitchell in Prescott. Like
most nineteenth-century legal apprentices, he did not think very
highly of the tutelage that he received. "With references to reading law in the office of Messrs,
Warren and Mitchell," he wrote, "it
may be said that, so far as my
knowledge goes, students are, in
the main, always self-instructed,
the old lawyers seldom ask any

L to R: Sheppard Arnold, Thomas Saxon Arnold, Richard Lewis Arnold,
William Hendrick Arnold, Jr. (1893-1977), William Hendrick Arnold Il, and
Richard Sheppard Arnold. The picture in the back is of William Hendrick
Arnold (1861-1946).

questions of the students with reference to books, and the conversation seems to relate to practical
matters or incidents of the present
time and in detailing their own experiences and successes, their failures never mentioned." Indeed,
he said that his mentors "were seldom in the office."7 In 1882 he was
admitted to the bar and, after practicing a few months in Prescott, in
1883 he moved to Texarkana and
established an office.
He arrived in Texarkana, a town
barely ten years old, with fifteen
second-hand law books, a bed and
mattress, "a little old tin or zinc
trunk," and forty dollars in cash.'
He rented a small room from W. J.
Smithers, a justice of the peace, for
$2.50 a month. His circumstances
were something less than palatial:
"There were holes in the floor," he
recalled, "through which the rats,
large and small, ran back and
forth all the live long night. He also
claimed that "the dirt on the floor
and tobacco juice had accumulated and must have been
half an inch thick in places," but he
"slept securely in that old building, although one would not have
thought it very secure as there
were fires in Texarkana at that
time nearly every night, and
nearly everything in the town was
burnt up first and last except that
old building."'
As might be expected, it took
William some time to establish a
practice. He bagan his work in the
J. P. courts of Texarkana, and one
of his first cases was a suit against
one L. Samuel, a pawnbroker, for a
wash-pot. The claim was that the
pot was stolen from his client, but
the defendant's expert (a hardware
man) testified that "there were a
great many black pots in the world
of this size, and it was doubtful
whether you could identify one
from the other." On the basis of
their testimony the case went
against William and fifty years
later he could still feel the sting:
"The loss of the wash-pot case," he
wrote, "hurt my conscience very
much, and I thought that there was
no justice in law.""
William claimed that "he was
naturally shrinking and timid" and
therefore his "business was not
very extensive for a long time,"
especially since he did not "cultivate acquaintances" or "mix
July 1984/Arkansas Lawyer/137

around with the business interest."" In time, however, he prospered, acquired a very large general practice, and argued several
cases before the Supreme Court of
the United States. He also was evidently able to overcome his purported shyness sufficiently to be
elected four times city recorder of
Texarkana (1885-88), mayor of
Texarkana (1892-94), and president
of the Texarkana School Board in
which capacity he served ten
years. In 1907 he was elected president of the Arkansas Bar Association. He also served as chairman of
the Miller County Democratic
Convention of 1917. In 1923 he attended the organizational meeting
of the American Law Institute. In
1925 he was appointed special associate justice of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas and in 1929 was
elected special judge of the Eighth
Circuit of Arkansas by the bar of
that circuit to fill a vacancy.
William Hendrick Arnold's eventual success in the law, the practice of which he vigorously pursued until his death in 1946, would
make it possible for his children to
enjoy educational advantages that
he had been denied. His first child,
]odie Claypool Arnold, attended
Randolph Macon Woman's College and the Drexel Institute; Lucy
Arnold, his next child, received a
B.A. from Randolph Macon in 1911;
and Ruth Arnold, the third daughter, attended Vassar and the University of Chicago.
The sons, all of whom were to
become lawyers, were also outfitted with the finest possible educations. William H. Arnold, Jr., the
eldest son, was born in 1893, was
graduated from Phillips Exeter
Academy in 1911, Harvard College
in 1915, and Oxford University in
1918. He attended Oxford as a
Rhodes Scholar and was a student
at the Inner Temple in London. He
was admitted to the Arkansas Bar
in 1916. He served in the Army in
France during World War I, and
was also a member of the Texas
and Louisiana bars. William, Jr.
was chairman of the Miller County
Democratic Central Committee
and was engaged in the general
practices of law in Texarkana until
his death on November 6, 1977.
David Christopher Arnold, William's second son, was born in
1896. He was graduated from Phil- -I
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lips Exeter Academy in 1913 and
attended the University of the
South. In 1918 he was admitted to
the bar of Arkansas. In 1920, at the
age of 24, he was elected to the
Arkansas House of Representatives. In 1922 he was elected to the
Arkansas Senate by a majority of
two to one and served one fouryear term. He died in 1936 after
being stricken while trying a case
in Miller County.
Richard Lewis Arnold, William's
youngest son, was born in 1906. He
was graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy in 1925, Yale College
in 1929, and Harvard Law School in
1932. He was admitted to the Arkansas bar in 1931 and was for
many years a member of the Board
of Directors and General Counsel
of Southwestern Electric Power Co.
He twice served as special associate justice of the Supreme Court
of Arkansas. He is presently living
in Texarkana.
William H. Arnold, Jr. had two
sons, both of whom became
lawyers. William Hendrick Arnold, III was born in 1923. He attended Rice University and received a B.A. from the University of

Texas in 1948. In 1950 he was
graduated from the University of
Texas Law School and the same
year was admitted to the bar of
Texas. In 1953 he was admitted to
the bar of Arkansas and in 1966
was elected circuit judge of the
Eighth Judicial District of Arkansas. He is presently engaged in the
practice of law in Texarkana in the
firm of Arnold and Arnold with his
brother Thomas Saxon Arnold.
Thomas was born in 1928 and was
graduated from Rice University in
1949 and the University of Texas
Law School in 1952. He was admitted to the bar of Texas in 1952, the
bar of Arkansas in 1953, and the
bar of Colorado in 1977. For many
years he has had interests in various title companies in the southwestern United States.
Richard Lewis Arnold's first son,
Richard Sheppard Arnold, was
born in 1936. He was graduated
from Phillips Exeter Academy in
1953, Yale College in 1957, where
he was first in his class, and Harvard Law School in 1960, where he
was again first in his class and
served as an editor of the Harvard
Law Review. In 1960 he was admit-
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ted to the Arkansas bar after having made the highest score on the
bar examination given in July of
that year. In 1961 he was admitted
to the bar of the District of Columbia. After a year's clerkship with
Mr. Justice Brennan of the Suprene
Court of the United States, he practiced for a time with the
Washington firm of Covington and
Burling before returning to Texarkana to join the family firm in 1964.
He was elected a delegate to the
Arkansas Constitutional Convention of 1969-70 and for a number of
years worked for Governor and
later Senator Dale Bumpers. In
1978 he was appointed a United
States district judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas and in 1980 he was elevated to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
where he presently sits. Judge Arnold's wife, Kay Kelley Arnold, a
graduate of the University of Arkansas and the UALR Law School,
was admitted to the Arkansas bar
in 1981. Morris Sheppard Arnold,
his brother, was born in 1941. He
was graduated from Phillips Exe-

ter Academy in 1959, attended Yale
College, and was graduated from
the University of Arkansas in 1965
and the University of Arkansas
Law School in 1968 where he was
Editor-in-Chief of the Arkansas
Law Review and first in his
graduating class. He was admitted to the Arkansas bar in 1968. In
1969 he received an LL.M. and in
1971 an S.J.D., both from Harvard
Law School where he was a
Teaching Fellow in Law in 1969.
He has taught law at a number of
American universities and in 1978
was a member of the Law Faculty
of Cambridge University. He is
presently a professor of Law and
History at the University of
Pennsylvania where he served as
vice president of the University
from 1979 to 1981. In 1982 he was
elected state chairman of the Arkansas Republican Party and the
same year was appointed special
chief justice of the Supreme Court
of Arkansas.
Though this list is long, it has not
exhausted the list of Arkansas Arnold lawyers. John H. Arnold, William Hendrick Arnold's first

cousin, was born in 1864, read law
in the Prescott firm of Smoote &
McRae, and was admitted to the
bar of Arkansas in 1884. He later
moved to Washington, Arkansas,
where he became mayor and a
member of the firm of Williams
and Williams. He died in 1925. Finally, W.H. (Dub) Arnold prosecuting attorney in Arkadelphia, is a
distant cousin.
The Arnolds have been practicing law in southwest Arkansas for
one hundred and two years. With
eleven of them having been admitted to the Arkansas bar, the Arnolds have one of the longest and
fullest family legal traditions in
0]
the state.
NOTES
1. W. H. Arnold. The Arnold Family 22
(1935).
2. Id. at 171.
3. Id. at 184.
4. Id. at 173.
5. Id. at 173-74.
6. Id. at 185.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 186.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 188.
11. Id.
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The Arkansas Court
of Appeals
On November 7, 1978, the voters
of the State of Arkansas approved
Amendment 58 to the Arkansas
Constitution, which provided for
the creation of the Arkansas Court
of Appeals.2 The impetus for the
new court had come from members
of the Arkansas Supreme Court
and others in the legal profession
who argued that the state's judicial system, and specifically the
Supreme Court, would suffer without it. Proponents argued that the
new court would reduce the Supreme Court's workload, allow
judges more time to consider cases
and write opinions, and make the
appellate process quicker and
more efficient.3
Because the creation of the Court
of Appeals brought about such a
dramatic change in the Arkansas
judicial structure, requiring the
expenditure of a substantial portion of state funds,' the general
public, as well as the members of
the bar, have a right to know
whether the change has been a
beneficial one.
This study was undertaken as an
attempt to determine whether the
projected benefits have accrued,
and what effects, if any, the creaEditor's Note: James D. Gingerich is University Counsel and assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Central
Arkansas. He is a 1980 graduate of
the University of Arkansas School
of Law in Fayetteville. He received
his L.L.M. in 1982 from the University of Bristol, England.
This article is a condensed version of a paper which won top honors at the Februarymeeting of the
Arkansas Political Science Association in Jonesboro.
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WAS IT
WORTH THE
TROUBLE?'
By James D. Gingerich

tion of the court has had on the
Supreme Court. Several factors
were chosen to measure changes
in the Supreme Court during the
years immediately preceding and
following the creation of the Court
of Appeals. The results of those
then
measurements
were
analyzed to determine the nature
and extent of the effect, and
whether the new court has
achieved those things which were
expected of it.

I. The Creation of the
Court of Appeals
At one time, the workload of the
Arkansas Supreme Court was very
stable. In 1964, a total of 464 cases
were disposed of by the court.' In
1970, that number had risen to 716'
and by 1976, they totaled a staggering 1037 cases-an increase of
123% in only 12 years.7 The earliest
appeals for help came from within
the membership of the Supreme
Court. In his 1976 annual report to
the Governor and General Assembly, then Chief Justice Carleton
Harris wrote:
Justices of the Supreme Court
wrote an average of over 73
opinions each in 1976 as compared with an average of 65
during 1975, substantiallyabove
the national averages for states

without an intermediate appeallatecourt. Total workload of
the Courtincreasedby almost 30
per cent during 1976 as compared with 1975. Despite the
heavy workload, the Court remains current, but it will be difficult for the Court to keep pace
with its skyrocketing workload
in the years to come unless help
in the form of an intermediate
appellate court for Arkansas is
forthcoming.(8)
The same theme was echoed in
civic meetings and legislative
committee hearings in subsequent
months by other members of the
Court, educators, and legal practitioners. These efforts realized success in March of 1977, when the
Arkansas General Assembly approved Senate Resolution 5,
which allowed the proposal to be
placed on the ballot in the 1978
general election. By more than a
two-to-one margin,8 the proposal
was approved by voters as
Amendment 58 to the Arkansas
Constitution.
The amendment itself was not
very specific. It simply provided
that the General Assembly was
empowered to create a court of appeals with such "jurisdiction as the
Supreme Court shall by rule
determine." All provisions concerning the number of judges,
method of election, length of term,
method of selecting the chief
judge, and issues relating to
salaries and staff support were left
to the Legislature.
This lack of specificity led to an
intense debate, especially in legal
circles, concerning the legislation
to implement the amendment. In a
vote in January of 1979, the House
of Delegates of the Arkansas Bar

Association was closely divided
over the bill which was then being
debated before the General Assembly. The most controversial
provisions concerned the sixperson composition of the court,
which could lead to evenly split
decisions, and the selection of the
chief judge by the chief justice of
the Supreme Court." The legislators, after lengthy discussions
and several amendments, eventually enacted Act 208 of 1979, including both of those provisions. On
July 7, 1979, Governor Bill Clinton
appointed the court's first members12 and its first opinions were
handed down one month later.

II. Measurements
and Expectations
When the creation of the Court of
Appeals was being debated, proponents argued that the following
benefits would result- (1)the workload of the Supreme Court would
be decreased; (2) the Supreme
Court would be able to hear only
the more "serious', cases, have
more time to decide them, and
consequently, write "better" opinions; (3) the appellate process
would become quicker and more
efficient; and (4) duplications in
the appellate process would be
avoided. In order to measure
whether these benefits have accrued, nine criteria were selected
as measurement tools. Supreme
Court decisions over a seven year
period, from 1976-1982, were
studied. 3 The criteria selected,
and the reason for their selection,
are as follows:
Workload
Two criteria were selected to
measure changes in the workload
of the Supreme Court. The first was
the number of cases which were
disposed of during each term. Included in the figures were all appeals, petitions, and motions
(other than motions for an extension of time) considered by the
court which were finally disposed
of during the term. The second

criteria selected was the total
number of majority opinions written each year, denominated into a
per-justice average.
If the Court of Appeals has produced the desired result, the
number of dispositions and majority opinions should decrease
after the 1979 term.
More Time to Consider Cases,
Write "Better" Opinions
The objective of allowing justices more time to consider and
write opinions is that it will allow
time for additional research,
thought, drafting, and, in the end,
produce a "better" opinion. The
problem, of course, is in developing a set of criteria to measure the
quality of an opinion which excludes, as much as possible, the
introduction of large amounts of
subjectivity.
In an attempt to avoid this problem, a method similar to that used
by Roger Groot in his study of the
North Carolina courts" was
adopted. With Groot's method,
there is no direct attempt to determine whether the quality of the
opinion has improved, but simply
to note those changes which would
indicate that additional time has
been put into the opinion writing
task.
Thus, four criteria were selected
for measurement. The first two involve the average number of
concurring and dissenting opinions written by each justice. In a
system in which a justice is overworked and pressed for time, it is
reasonable to assume that if he
agreed with the result reached by
the majority, he would join the
opinion even though he disagreed
with the reasoning used. Likewise,
a justice who disagreed with the
result of the majority would issue
an opinion in only those cases in
which he possessed very strong
feelings. In both instances, with
more time available to develop
and formulate his own reasoning,
a justice would be more likely to
express it. Thus, it should be ex-

pected that the number of concurring and dissenting opinions
would increase after the creation
of the Court of Appeals.
A third criterion studied concerns the length of opinions. With
more time available to do research
and develop and expand lines of
reasoning, the length of the justices' opinions should increase.
Thus, if proponents were correct in
their projections, one would expect
the number of pages per opinion to
increase after 1979.
Finally, the number of per
curium opinions was studied. If
the appellate courts are properly
structured so that the Supreme
Court hears only the more important cases, the number of those
cases disposed of with per cirium
opinions should decrease. In addition, with more time to consider
cases, those which would have
previously resulted in a per curium
order could be handled with a full
opinion. Thus, if the Court of Appeals has had the desired effect,
the number of per curium opinions
should decrease after 1979.
Make the Appellate Process
Quicker and More Efficient
The obvious method of determining whether the appellate process
requires less time is to count the
average number of days cases are
before the cour c. The Arkansas Judicial Department has been tracking selected cases through the
courts for several years, and their
findings are used here for this purpose. The time measured begins
on the day in which the record is
filed with the Supreme Court and
ends on the day when the decision
is rendered. It should be expected
that the amount of time will decrease following the creation of the
Court of Appeals.
As to the court's efficiency, this
criterion is usually determined by
measuring its currency, that is, the
number of cases which are disposed of within the term as compared to the number of cases
which are filed. With a smaller
July 1984/Arkansas Lawyer/141
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workload, it should be expected
that the disposition ratio of the
court will increase after 1979.
Avoid Duplication of Appeals
The final benefit noted by the
Court of Appeals' proponents was
that the structure of the court
would insure that duplication in
the appellate process would be
avoided. The only way a case once
heard by the Court of Appeals may
reach the Supreme Court is by a
grant of certiorari. In order to assess the success of this structure,
the number of petitions for review
granted by the Supreme Court
were compared to the total number
of cases disposed of by the Court of
Appeals. If the proponents were
correct, only a very small percentage of the cases disposed of
should have been accepted for review by the Supreme Court.

III. Findings and Analysis

5

1. Dispositions. At first glance,
there seems to be a little change in
the number of Supreme Court dispositions before and after the creation of the Court of Appeals (See
Table 1). In 1976, there were 1037
cases disposed of, rising to 1234 in
1979. By 1982, the number of dispositions had dropped to 1062,16 a
decline of only 14%
WORKLOAD AS MEASURED BY
NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT, 1976-1982
Non-Time
Year Appeals Petition. Motions Total
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

551
576
585
657
512
468
437

186
190
203
244
312
208
224
Table 1

300
268
282
333
398
384
401

1037
1034
1070
1234
1222
1060
1062

The figures are more enlightening, however, when compared to
the number of dispositions which
would have resulted had the Court
of Appeals not been created. Since
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the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court prior to the creation of the
Court of Appeals is basically the
same as that presently shared by
the two courts,' 7 an indication of
what the Supreme Court's workload would have been can be
made by adding the workload of
the two courts. The number of dispositions for the Court of Appeals
is found in Table 2. In 1982 had
these cases been added to the
workload of the Supreme Court,
they would have totaled 1754
cases. As compared to the actual
workload of 1062 cases, this is a
real decline of 1692 cases, or 61%
(See Table 3). Thus, it can be seen
that the creation of the Court of
Appeals has had a significant effect on the decline in the number of
dispositions by the Supreme
Court.

WORKLOAD AS MEASURED BY
NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS, 1979-1982
Non-Time
Your Appeals Petitions Motions Total
415
93
96
226
1979
1347
284
905
158
1980
1425
361
178
886
1981
1692
466
164
1062
1982
Table 2

2. Number of Majority Opinions.
A look at the average number of
published opinions per justice
provides further evidence of the
Supreme Court's decreasing workload. From a high of 77 majority
opinions per justice in 1978, the
average had dropped 41% to 45
opinions in 1982 (See Table 4). This
decline is even more dramatic
when it is considered that the
number of actual cases disposed of

NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS IN SUPREME COURT
AND COURT OF APPEALS, 1976-1982 The shaded area represents the difference bee Court
tween the Supreme Court's
Suprem
Appel
actual workload and the
- - - Court of Appeals
workload which would
-. - Total, B othCourte
3000
have resulted had not the
2900
Court of Appeals been
2800
created.
-*A
2700
2600
2500
2400
2300
2200
2100
2000
1900
1800
1700
1600
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100
/
1000
/
900
/
800
I
700
/
600
/
500
/
400
I

I

I

1976

1977

I
I
1979
1978
Table 3

I
1980

I
1981

I
1982

in the Supreme Court alone had
remained fairly constant. This can
be explained by the fact that the
percentage of cases disposed of
with a written opinion has steadily
declined (See Table 5). This decline is largely a result of the decreasing number of appeals taken
to the Supreme Court, which are
more likely to be disposed of with
a written opinion than are petitions and motions (See Table I).
The largest decline is from 1979 to
1980, a direct result of the effects
of the Court of Appeals. Thus It
appears that the creation of the
court has produced the desired
result of decreasing the workload
of the Supreme Court.

Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

number of all opinions declined
during the period. The percentage
of all opinions made up of concurring opinions increased from 4% in
1979 to 13% in 1982. Thus, the expected rise in concurring opinions
after 1979 has, in fact, resulted.
4. Frequency of Dissenting
Opinions. Similarly, the number of
dissenting opinions has increased
over the period (See Table 6). From
1976-1978 the Supreme Court wrote
an average of 52.33 dissenting
opinions per year, representing an
average of 8.66% of the total opinions handed down during the
period. From 1980-1982 the number
had increased to 70 dissenting

WORKLOAD AS MEASURED BY NUMBER OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT. 1976-1982
Ave. Per
All
Ave. Per
# Other
Ave. Per
# Maj.
Justice
Opinions
Justice
Opinions
Justice
Opinions
83
581
10
72
73
509
77
542
8
54
70
488
91
634
14
95
77
539
78
544
13
91
65
453
70
493
20
141
50
352
63
439
16
112
47
327
60
418
14
100
45
318
Table 4

NUMBER OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL DISPOSITIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1976-1982
Written
Year Dispositions Opinions Percentage
56%
581
1037
1976
52%
542
1034
1977
59%
634
1070
1978
44%
544
1234
1979
40%
493
1222
1980
41%
439
1060
1981
39%
418
1062
1982
Table 5

3. Frequency of Concurring
Opinions. In the three years preceding the creation of the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court wrote
an average of 16.33 concurring
opinions per year. In the years following the court's creation, that
average increased to 39 opinions
per year (See Table 6). This number
increased even though the total

per case has declined." In 1976,
the court published 256 opinions
with an average of 4.5 pages per
case (See table 7). By 1982, the
number of published opinions had
increased to 382, but the average
had declined to 3.4 pages per case.
The average has declined each
year since 1979.
One possible explanation external to the Court of Appeals which
may account for the decline is related to the publication of the
court's opinions. It was at one time
a policy of the Supreme Court to
publish only certain types of opinions; those which involved routine
issues or were not useful for reference purposes were not designated for publication." In 1979,
this rule was changed to provide
that "all signed opinions of the Supreme Court shall be. designated
for publication. Prior to 1979, therefore, many opinions which resolved routine issues, and thus were
more likely to be shorter opinions,
were not published; whereas, following 1979, all cases were included.

NUMBER OF MAJORITY, DISSENTING. AND CONCURRING OPINIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT, 1978-1982
Dissenting Op.
Majority Op.
Year
%#_#__
#__%#
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

509
488
539
453
352
327
318

88%
90%
85%
83%
71%
74%
76%

55
37
65
62
95
79
36

Dissenting in Part and
Concurring Op. Concurring in Part Total

9%0 11
7% 14
10% 24
11% 23
19% 35
18% 26
9% 56
Table 6

opinions per year, an average of
15.33% of the total opinions.
5. Number of Pages Per Opinion.
If the Supreme Court had declining
workloads and additional time to
consider cases, it is reasonable to
expect that the length of opinions
issued by the court would increase. The evidence, however,
indicates that the number of pages

2% 6
3% 3
4% 6
4% 6
7% 11
6%17
130/ 8

1%
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
2%

581
542
634
544
493
439
418

6. Number of Per Curium Opinions. Other than to note that the
number of per curium opinions
rose dramatically in 1982, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from
the figures. The percentage of per
curium opinions decreased in the
years preceding the Court of Appeals, then began to rise slowly
until 1982 (See Table 8). The

July 1984/Arkansas Lawyer/143

expectation was that they would
decrease after 1979. It may be that
the increasing percentage of the
Supreme Court's workload made
up by petitions and motions, as
opposed to appeals (See Table 1)
has increased the use of per
curiums. The number of appeals
decreased 21% from 1976 to 1982,
whereas the number of petitions
and motions increased about 29%
during the same period. Even if
this could be shown, however, it
would not account for the dramatic
increase of per curiums in 1982.
NUMBER OF PAGES PER CASE*
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT, 1978-1982
P/C
Paes.
Cases
Year
4.5
1159
256
1976
4.0
1102
275
1977
4.1
1367
333
1978
4.4
1626
371
1979
4.1
1515
367
1980
3.5
1300
375
1981
3.4
1288
382
1982
Table 7
Includes all opinions written and published by
the Supreme Court, includingper curium opinions.

PER CURIUM OPINIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1978-1982
Number
Number
%
Year Per Curiums Total Opinions
7%
624
43
1976
5%
570
28
1977
2%
650
16
1978
3%
560
16
1979
4%
515
22
1980
9%
485
46
1981
20/0
524
106
1982
Table 8

7. Number of Days in Appellate
Court. The results of the survey
concerning the average length of
time a case is before the Supreme
Court are somewhat mixed. The
average time for all cases actually
rose substantially from 1979 to
1980--from 173.5 days to 196.5 days
(See Table 9). The average has
steadily declined since reaching
its lowest point during the seven
years in 1982 with an average of
149,5 days.
While the average time for all
cases has increased, that increase
144/Arkansas Lawyer/July 1984

is solely attributable to the increased time to hear criminal
cases. The average time for civil
cases has declined each year since
1979. This added time to hear criminal cases is no doubt a result of
the change in the Supreme Court's
criminal jurisdiction. While the
court was hearing all criminal
cases before the creation of the
Court of Appeals, it now hears only
the most serious criminal cases involving a sentence of death, life
imprisonment, or at least 30 years
imprisonment. The more substantial issues, especially in capital
cases, have increased the amount
of time these cases are before the
court. As a result, the Court of Appeals has not had the immediate
result of decreasing the amount of
time a case is before the Supreme
Court. AVERAGE TIME CASE IS
BEFORE APPELLATE COURT*

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1978-1982
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

Ave.
Ave.
Civil Criminal
Cases
Cases
146
181
137
178
150
173
146
201
209
184
188
177
153
146
Table 9

Ave.

An
Cases
163.5
157.5
161.5
173.5
196.5
182.5
149.5

Figuresare based upon a yearly survey of cases
by the Judicial Department of Arkansas. All
cases in which there was a written majority
opinion areincluded in the survey. Per curiums,
cases transferred pursuant to Rule 29, cases
dismissed without opinions, and exceptional
cases which tend to skew the statistical objective of the survey were not included.

8. Currency. With the currency
level of over 100% in the calendar
year preceding the creation of the
Court of Appeals, it is difficult to
expect that level to be improved. In
fact, the disposition ratio increased to 110.57% in 1979, dropped to 95.39% in 1980, and then returned to above the 100% level in
1981 and 1982 (See Table 10). Because the Supreme Court did such
an admirable job of remaining current despite a pressing workload
before its creation, it is difficult to

tell if the Court of Appeals has had
any effect.
DISPOSITION RATIO (CURRENCY)
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1977-1982*
Number Disposition
Number
Rate
Filings Dispositions
Year
95.21
1034
1086
1977
105.73
1070
1012
1978
110.57
1234
1116
1979
95.39
1222
1281
1980
103.81
1060
1021
1981
108.47
1062
979
1992
Table 10
Figures for 1976 were not available,

9. Number of Petitions for Review Granted. The last general
goal stated by the proponents of
the Court of Appeals was to insure
that the court did not slow down or
complicate the appellate process
by allowing a system of "dual" appeals. Dr. Robert Leflar, one of the
leading figures in the court's establishment, suggested that "3 or 4
percent is too large, of the cases
decided by the intermediate court,
[to] go on to the Supreme Court."' 2
The figures indicate that the system has easily met that goal. In the
first six months of the Court of Appeals' existence, 8 cases, or 2% of
the court's 415 total dispositions,
were heard again in the Supreme
Court (See Table 11). The percentage has decreased each year
so that by 1982, only .3% (5 of 1692)
of the Court of Appeal cases were
accepted for review.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW GRANTED
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1979-1982
Total
NumberDispositions In
Petitions
Court of Appeals %
Granted
Year
2%
415
8
1979
1%
1347
15
1980
.6%
1425
9
1981
.3%
1692
5
1982
Table 11

IV. Conclusion
From this analysis, it can be
concluded that the insertion of the
Court of Appeals into the Arkansas
appellate structure has been
largely successful. Most of the
benefits which were projected by

II I

the court's proponents have, in
fact, resulted. The decrease in the
workload of the Supreme Court,
during a time in which the number
of appeals from lower courts has
increased dramatically, has relieved the court of a tremendous
burden. The substantial decrease
in the number of majority opinions
written per justice and the increasing frequency of concurring and
dissenting opinions suggest that
justices now have more time
available to consider cases. In addition, the court continues to be
one of the most efficient in the United States.
The success of the new system Is
due largely to the unique structure
of the two courts. By providing
each court with its own separate
jurisdiction, the largest possible
number of appeals can be processed and the problem of having
"dual" appeals is avoided.
One of the goals which has not
been so successfully met involves
the nature of the cases heard by
the Supreme Court. While the rule
providing for the division of the
two appellate courts' jurisdiction
was intended to allow the Supreme Court to hear only the more
important cases and issues of
some serious legal significance,
recent additions to that jurisdiction have been made solely to
effectuate a balance between the
number of cases filed in the two
courts. Thus in many instances,
the cases heard by the Supreme
Court are no more important than
those heard by the Court of
appeals-they are merely different. One might argue that what
results is an appellate system having two supreme courts. However,
so long as the Supreme Court retains the right to review cases
heard by the Court of Appeals, it
remains the "supreme" court, and
any dilution of its jurisdiction is
more than outweighed by the advantage of smaller workloads and
the resulting quality and efficiency in the appellate process.

I

From a situation in which bulging dockets and increasing workloads were threatening the integrity of the Arkansas appellate system, the Arkansas Court of Appeals has emerged to save the day. A
review of the evidence suggests
that its creation has had a positive
effect on the Supreme Court and
accomplished those things which
were expected of it. With the Supreme Court's ability to constantly
monitor the workload between the
two courts, to make necessary adjustments, and to exercise control
over those cases which are accepted for review from the Court of
Appeals, the work product, efficiency, and effectiveness of the
Supreme Court and the Arkansas
judicial system should continue to
improve in the years to come. 0
FOOTNOTES

This is a condensed version of a paper
which was presented to the Arkansas
Political Science Association in Jonesboro, Arkansas in February, 1984.
Amendment 58 provides:
The General Assembly is hereby empowered to create and establish a Court
of Appeals and divisions thereof. The
Court of Appeals shall have such appel.
late jurisdiction as the Supreme Court
shall by rule determine, and shall be
subject to the general superintending
control of the Supreme Court. Judges of
the Court of Appeals shall have the same
qualifications as justices of the Supreme
Court and shall be selected in the manner provided by law.
Arkansas Gazette, March 4, 1977, §B at 1,
col. 7 and September 2, 1978, §A at 9, col.
1.
In 1982, a total of $1,018,514 was
budgeted for the 1983-84 Fiscal Year for
the salaries and operating expenses of
the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
First Annual Report of Judicial Department of Arkansas, [herein cited as Annual Report].
1979 Annual Report.
1976 Annual Report.

* Letter from Carleton Harris to David
Pryor, contained in 1976 Annual Report.
Senate Joint Resolution 5, Acts of Arkansas 1977, p. 2431.
20 The official vote totaled 291,941 for the
amendment, 141,792 against the
amendment.
2 Arkansas Gazette, January 21, §A at 9,
col. 1.
22 The first members of the court included
M. Steele Hays, David Newbern, Mrs.
Marian Penix, George Howard, Jr., Ernie
Wright, and James Pilkinton. These
members served until January 1, 1981,
when the first elected members of the
court assumed office. Arkansas Gazette,
July 8, 1979, §A at 1, col. 3.
One problem with the figures which must
be noted is the fact that the personnel of
the court changed during this period.
Three of the justices who were on the
court in 1976 remained in 1982. The extent
to which this change in personnel affected the court is not considered in this
study.
'R R.D. Groot, "The Effects of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Supreme
Court Work Product; The North Carolina
Experience," 7 Wake Forest Law Review
548, 1971.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all figures were
compiled from the Annual Reports of the
Arkansas Judicial Department for years
1976-1982.
2. The 1982 Annual Report, p. 21, incorrectly
calculates the total dispositions at 928.
This appears to be due to an error in addition for petitions and motions which is
listed at 491, but actually totaled 625.
2? The only significant change in the Jurisdiction of the court concerned the addition of appeals from the Employment Security Division. Originally, these cases
were appealed to the circuit court in the
county where the appellant resided. In
1979, all such appeals were transferred
to the Court of Appeals. Ark. Stat. Ann.
§I107(dX7) (Repl. 1976). These cases constituted 154 dispositions in 1980, 360 in
1981, and 391 in 1982.
" These figures were compiled from a review of all cases published by the Supreme Court for January 1, 1976-December 31. 1982, contained in volumes
531-644 of the South Western Reporter,
2nd. Series. The figures used for each
case include any page on which any part
of the case appeared.
25 See, Smith, "The Selective Publication of
Opinions: One Court's Experience," 32
Ark. L. Rev. 26 (1978) and Newbern and
Wilson, "Rule 21: Unprecedent and the
Disappearing Court," 32 Ark. L. Rev. 37
(1978).
80 Arkansas Supreme Court Rules, rule
21.1.
"2Arkansas Gazette, September 2,1978 §A
at 9, col. 1.
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BULLETIN
ABA Model Rules on Professional Conduct:
An Update
I

By Herschel H. Friday
On August 2, 1983, after more
than six (6) years of study and hearings, the American Bar Association House of Delegates approved
a new set of rules governing the
professional conduct of lawyers. If
history repeats itself, these rules
will ultimately be adopted substantially intact in most of the
states. Certain states have already taken action.
State bars or bar associations in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
Michigan have recommendations
for the adoption of the Model Rules
in their new format pending before
their supreme courts. In Pennsylvania a court-ordered comment
period was expired and the Model
Rules themselves and the State
Bar Association's recommendations have been referred to the Disciplinary Board for final comment.
The State Bar of Maryland's Board
of Governors is expected to approve a final version of its committee's report in time to make a recommendation to its Court of Appeals in May.
Arizona's high court
is
scheduled to receive a recommendation from their state bar shortly,
and Montana and Kansas will report to their high courts in April
and June, respectively. The state of
Virginia had adopted a new Code
of Professional responsibility in
October, 1983, having used the
Model Rules as a starting point
and adopting certain substantive
portions of the Rules, but adhering
to the Model Code format.
In most of the other states there
are committees in existence
charged with the responsibility of
guiding the rules through the
necessary educational and adoption processes.
The committee in Arkansas
(created by the Arkansas Bar Association) consists of Philip Anderson, John F. Stroud, Jr., H. William
Allen, Howard W. Brill, Jack Deacon, John Fogleman, John Gill,
Jerry W. Cavaneau, Richard N.
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Moore, Jr. and Herschel H. Friday,
chair. We are holding meetings
and making presentations to various bar associations and interested groups and will present a
program at the Annual Meeting of
the Arkansas Bar Association in
Hot Springs on Thursday, June 7,
1984. We have not seen fit to set a
rigid timetable but will proceed as
diligently as possible.
The new rules contain a total of
eight categories and 52 individual
rules as follows:
Number
Category
of Rules
Client-Lawyer Relationship .... 16
Counselor .....................
3
Advocate ......................
9
Transactions with Persons
Other than Clients ........... 4
Law Firms and Associations .... 6
Public Service .................
4
Information About
Legal Services ............... 5
Maintaining the Integrity of
the Profession ............... S

.

I think it is fair to say that most of
the criticisms of earlier drafts have
been answered. There remains in
the minds of some lawyers and
laymen (as has always been the
case) doubts about the rules that
deal with certain historically controversial subjects (particularly
confidentialy and other aspects of
client-lawyer relationships, some
subjects dealt with rules in the advocate category and the varying
but deliberate use of both mandatory and permissive language).
Nevertheless, most seem to agree
that the rules represent a comprehensive and responsible effort
to keep the governing standards
for professional conduct of lawyers
abreast of the times and most like
the new restatement format. I urge
each of you to take the time to read
and study the proposed Model
Rules and contact our Committee
with any suggestions or comments
which you may have.
0

qod'man &

.Ctdo.ai,
l.

CHEMICAL CONSULTANTS
* PRODUCT AND PROCESS LIABILITY CASES,
* TOXIC SUBSTANCES (PESTICIDES, HAZARDOUS WASTE,
AND TRANSPORTATION).
* CONTRABAND DRUG ANALYSIS AND BLOOD ALCOHOL
ANALYSIS. RANDOM AND ACCIDENT RELATED DRUG
SCREENING
* TOXICITY OF CHEMICALS AND WASTES (TOSCA, EPA,
NIOSH-REG, OSHA)
• MARINE AND OFFSHORE LITIGATIONS INVOLVING
PETROLEUM, CHEMICALS, AND HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS
-OFFSHORE PERSONAL INJURY, EXPLOSIONS-FIRES
* SLIP AND FALL LITIGATIONS (COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION
INSTRUMENTS)
* PLASTICS AND NON-METALLIC FAILURES
* LABORATORY ANALYSIS FACILITIES (CHEMICAL, BIOCHEMICAL, DRUGS AND METALLURGICAL)
• CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY, INSURANCE CO'S, AND
LEGAL PROFESSION
• EXPERT WITNESS APPEARANCES
P.O. Box 8777
(504) 831-7695
Metalrle, LA 70001
488-5518
454-0774 (24 hours)
392-7961
PLEASE WRITE FOR OUR BROCHURE

